At Volokh Conspiracy, Zachary Price (UC Hastings) is guest-blogging on his article (noted here) Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty. Here are his posts so far:
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty: Introduction
Why Enfrocement Discretion Is Hard to Think about Clearly
Why Presidents Resort to Policy-Based Non-Enforcement, and Why It's Concerning
The Correct Framework for Executive Enforcement Discretion
Defeasibility of Enfrocement Discretion
Also, in the Washington Post, George Will has an opinion piece invoking Professor Price's article: Obama's Extreme Use of Executive Discretion.
Price's core conclusion (from the article's abstract) is this:
Presidents may properly decline enforcement of civil and criminal prohibitions in particular cases, notwithstanding their obligation under the Take Care Clause to ensure that “the Laws be faithfully executed.” But this authority does not extend to prospective licensing of prohibited conduct, nor to policy-based non-enforcement of federal laws for entire categories of offenders.
My question is: to what extent can this conclusion be reached solely on originalist grounds? (Professor Price's article employs a number originalist arguments, but also seems to invoke some arguments that are not really originalist.)
Posted at 6:38 AM