I agree with most of what Michael Ramsey says just below about the Commerce Clause and the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act. I have argued, however (here and here), that the Equal Protection Clause is about literal protection from violence. I argue here at pp. 308-09 that had the Violence Against Women Act been structured to provide a federal civil remedy only in cases where states had failed to supply one, it would have been constitutional. The debates leading to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 make clear (see pp. 248-51) that Congress may supply "protection of the laws" if states have not supplied it. The more difficult issue, which tripped up the law in United States v. Harris in 1883, is whether Congress may supply protection even if states may be doing do adequately.
The two categories of argument about abortion–fetal personhood and the mother's bodily integrity–have constitutional analogues as well. Michael Paulsen discusses at some length here whether a human fetus is a "person" under section 1. There are also complications analogous to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous self-defense-style violinist hypotheticals. Even if DeShaney came out the other way, as I advocate, states would not be required to protect burglars against homeowners' uses of defensive force, even though burglars are uncontroversially persons. To rebut the argument that states are likewise not required to forbid the use of force by women to defend their bodily integrity against the fetus, more argument would be needed. See here at p. 300 for a bit more on this point.
Posted at 12:53 PM