Sheldon Novick (Vermont Law School) has posted Failures of Originalism: The Uncertain Meaning of 'Citizen of the United States' on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Originalist interpretation seeks a definite “public understanding” of Constitutional language at the time of its adoption. The method fails when applied to language that cannot be understood in this way. In 1789, the word “citizen” as used in the Constitution, to take an important example, was a recent American coinage. English dictionaries of the time defined a citizen as a “townsman” or “tradesman;” the Constitution itself helped to give the word its new American sense, a person who had political rights, but this meaning was not well established until years later. At the time of ratification, “citizen” appears to have been understood by many of the Constitution’s draftsmen as signifying a narrow class of property-owning, white men, but the term was left to be further defined in each state, and understandings varied between town and country, slave state and free. Congress in its early years debated the nature and existence of national citizenship, without producing an authoritative definition. Taney’s originalist opinion in Dred Scott confirmed the narrow view of national citizenship originally held by some of the Framers. The Fourteenth Amendment reversed Dred Scott and created a new national citizenship, but the Supreme Court sharply limited the effect of the new language. The core of the Constitution, defining the class of persons who have rights and the rights that they hold, has been constructed piecemeal and continues to change. Originalism in this sphere died with Dred Scott.
The question of what the founding generation meant by "citizen" is a fascinating one, and this article sheds interesting light on it. Unfortunately the article is marred by at least two flaws brought on by its needless attempt to cast itself as a critique of modern originalism (on which score it totally fails) as opposed to an insightful account of the early meanings of "citizen" (where it succeeds). First it makes the now-familiar error of associating orignalism as a theory with Chief Justice Taney's manifestly incorrect application of originalism in Dred Scott — indeed, not even mentioning Justice Benjamin Curtis' far superior originalist dissent. Second it makes the puzzling claim that, post-1868, originalism has nothing useful to say about citizenship. To the contrary, I would say that — whatever the ambiguities of "citizen" in the founding era – Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment appeared to provide a (relatively) clear rule of near-universal birthright citizenship for persons born in the United States. True, as the article indicates, subsequent Supreme Court cases may have misread to some extent what the rights of citizens were intended to be, but (especially with the re-affirmance of broad birthright citizenship in the Wong Kim Ark case) I don't see a whole lot of post-1868 originalist ambiguity about who was a citizen. And in any event, neither of these points have much to do with the far more interesting question of what "citizen" meant to the generation of 1789, which seems far from settled.
Posted at 7:00 AM