Robert F. Nagel (University of Colorado Law School) has posted Conservatism and Constitutionalism in the United States (22 pages) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This paper inquires whether conservative political philosophy provides intellectual resources that might be expected to prevent judges from yielding to the temptation to impose their own strong moral beliefs about how society should be improved. The question emerges from the fact that for more than four decades a Supreme Court dominated by relatively conservative appointees has continued to produce decisions mandating radical social changes that cannot be convincingly traced to conventional sources of legal authority.
The paper examines a range of ideas about what conservatism is and rejects the possibility that most of these can be expected to discipline the temptation to impose personal moral visions and aspirations. However, one strand of conservative thought is identified that can provide the necessary self-restraint. This strand is found in the writings of Burke on tradition and of Oakeshott on practical knowledge and in Scalia’s defense of the practice of defining traditions at the narrowest level of generality.
(Via Larry Solum at Legal Theory Blog, who says "Recommended.")
It's not clear to me, however, how a particular brand of political philosophy can be a restraining influence on people (especially judges) who don't share that philosophy. True, one could attempt to convert everyone to that philosophy, but it seems perhaps more likely that one could find an institutional argument (such as judicial restraint or originalism) that might appeal to people of various political philosophies.
Posted at 6:51 AM