May 05, 2013

At Balkinization, Stephen Griffin has a long post describing his forthcoming book Long Wars and the Constitution (avaliable for pre-order at Amazon; projected publication date May 13).  Here is part of his description:

Although I have something to say about what happened prior to World War II, especially with respect to the eighteenth century, in understanding the situation we face in contemporary times, I think it is most critical to reach an understanding of what happened in the Cold War, our last “long” war.

…[A]lthough I argue there is little doubt contemporary presidents have departed from the historical meaning of the Constitution, I do not think there is a way to return to the practices that prevailed in the early republic.  So whatever problems we may have, there is no meaningful eighteenth century fix, any more than we could recreate an eighteenth century military.  I do not mean to say that there are no solutions.  Rather, there are no solutions that anyone in the eighteenth century would find familiar.

I also reject what might be called the “presumption of equal relevance” – the idea that each use of presidential war power, especially in the nineteenth century, is equally relevant to the circumstances we face today.  I largely agree with the “1950 thesis” that Truman’s commitment of troops to Korea without authorization from Congress marked a sharp break in our constitutional tradition.  But the crucial point is not so much the power Truman asserted but rather that he had new state capacities and resources available to him (and all post-World War II presidents) that were not available to prior presidents.  The critical variable of state capacity has been mostly ignored in previous studies of presidential war powers.  Once we take it into account, it will alter our perspective and understanding of the use of war powers since 1945.

And here is the description from Amazon:

In a wide-ranging constitutional history of presidential war decisions from 1945 to the present, Stephen M. Griffin rethinks the long-running debate over the “imperial presidency” and concludes that the eighteenth-century Constitution is inadequate to the challenges of a post-9/11 world.

The Constitution requires the consent of Congress before the United States can go to war. Truman’s decision to fight in Korea without gaining that consent was unconstitutional, says Griffin, but the acquiescence of Congress and the American people created a precedent for presidents to claim autonomy in this arena ever since. The unthinking extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to a point where presidents unilaterally decide when to go to war, Griffin argues, has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Long Wars and the Constitution demonstrates the unexpected connections between presidential war power and the constitutional crises that have plagued American politics.

Contemporary presidents are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand are the responsibilities handed over to them by a dangerous world, and on the other is an incapacity for sound decisionmaking in the absence of interbranch deliberation. President Obama’s continuation of many Bush administration policies in the long war against terrorism is only the latest in a chain of difficulties resulting from the imbalances introduced by the post-1945 constitutional order. Griffin argues for beginning a cycle of accountability in which Congress would play a meaningful role in decisions for war, while recognizing the realities of twenty-first century diplomacy.

Posted at 6:21 AM