At Breitbart, Joel Pollack argues that the Corker-Menendez bill (officially the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act) would "gut[ ] the Senate’s constitutional power over treaties":
[The] Treaty Clause of the Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 2, Clause 2): “The President…shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur…”. Instead, the legislation grants both houses of Congress the ability to approve an Iran deal by majority vote. That is a significant, and possibly unconstitutional, lowering of the bar.
(Via Elizabeth Price Foley at Instapundit, who has more comments and links here, and has further thoughts here).
In a prior post I explained why I think the bill itself is not a problem — briefly, it only affects the President's ability to lift sanctions and does not speak (directly) to the agreement as a whole.
At the same time, I'm sympathetic to the post, because (a) it's correct that if the deal is going to be a binding agreement it should be a treaty, and (b) even though the Corker-Menendez bill does not directly set up Congress to approve the deal, people may argue that it does so implicitly.
In my view the key to keeping the situation (somewhat) constitutional goes back to Senator Cotton's letter of a couple of weeks ago. So long as the impending deal is a nonbinding arrangement, it's (sort of) constitutional without the Senate or Congress approving. Indeed, under the relevant statutes as I understand them the President could lift the sanctions on his own authority without any deal with Iran at all, as gesture of good faith. The key (as Senator Cotton tried to make clear) is that with a nonbinding agreement the current Congress, or the next President, could put the sanctions back in place. But that depends on everyone understanding that the deal is nonbinding.
Related: Greg Sargent comments on the revised version of the bill here. The revisions do not appear to affect my view of it.
Posted at 9:14 AM