December 24, 2014

Following up on this post, Will Baude has further thoughts on ambiguity and judicial disagreement, responding to this post by Adrian Vermeule.  A key point:

There are at least two proposed ways for a textualist judge to find ambiguity because of a non-textualist judge’s view. One proposal is that the textualist judge finds ambiguity because there is “ambiguity in the choice of interpretive approaches,” — i.e., “reasonable minds can disagree about the proper approach to interpretation.” That’s the proposal in [Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's] joint post #1. Another proposal is that the textualist judge learns something from the non-textualist judge about the textualist meaning, because there are overlapping inputs into textualist and non-textualist meaning. That’s the proposal in Adrian’s latest response.

One could endorse either, or both, but it’s worth being clear about them because they’ll have different implications for how and when the theory actually works.

 

Posted at 6:26 AM