Michael Dorf's thoughts on Constitution Day: Why Should Constitution Day Be Observed? And Some Thoughts on the Constitution's Non-Fundamentality (plus a prediction for the demise of originalism).
Will Baude comments here, with many good points including these:
… But I am more optimistic about originalism’s place in our shared social convention.
As a matter of American legal practice, originalism is pretty firmly ensconced as at least one legitimate methodology among others. That doesn’t mean all or even most judges are originalists — just that originalism is thought to be relevant to constitutional adjudication. If there is no precedent or firmly-ensconced practice on point, the original meaning of a provision is often quite important. And even if there is a precedent or practice, the further afield it is from the original meaning, the harder it is to retain or expand that practice — ceteris paribus.
Moreover, the important developments in originalism in the past decade or two have made originalism easier to reconcile with many of our modern legal conventions. So-called “new originalists” now have more sophisticated theories for accounting for changed historical circumstances, precedent, and linguistic indeterminacy. The upshot is that it’s easier for originalists to say that many parts of our modern practice are “not wrong” or “not anti-originalist.” New originalism also seems to be less partisan, as evidenced by scholars like Jack Balkin and groups like the Constitutional Accountability Center.
Obviously, time will tell on this question, and both Dorf and I may be biased and think that what we want to happen in the future is also what will likely happen in the future. But I think there’s good reason to think that originalism will be part of our law for a while to come.
Meanwhile, at the Constitutional Accountability Center, Elizabeth Wydra finds Something's Missing from Scalia's Story (refering to Justice Scalia's pre-Constitution Day speech at George Washington Law School):
By the time our nation’s Founders took up the task of drafting the Constitution in 1787, they had lived under the dysfunctional Articles for a decade and were focused on creating a new, better form of government with a sufficiently strong federal power. In considering how to grant such power to the national government, the delegates adopted Resolution VI, which declared that Congress should have authority “to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual legislation.” The principle of Resolution VI was translated into constitutional provisions—specifically, the powers granted to Congress in Article I of the Constitution—affording the federal government the ability to provide national solutions to national problems.
Of course, conservatives like Justice Scalia might not like this part of our constitutional story so much, because it helps to refute the claim that the Constitution is a document that is primarily about limiting government. The historical context shows that the Founders were just as, if not more, concerned with creating an empowered, effective national government than with setting stark limits on federal power. When we think about the preamble to the Constitution, which declares that “We the People” have ordained and established the Constitution in order to create a “more perfect Union,” it is important to remember that the Framers sought to create a system of government more perfect than the British tyranny against which they revolted and more perfect than the dysfunctional Articles of Confederation under which they had floundered as a fledgling nation.
…
Let’s hope that Justice Scalia was just editing for time in his speech today when he left out the history of the Articles of Confederation and our Founders’ desire to remedy the Articles’ failings by creating an appropriately strong federal government. After all, he exhorted the audience not to fall prey to the attractions of a theory of constitutional interpretation that oh-so-conveniently results in the Constitution meaning exactly what your political or moral agenda would like it to mean. If you, like Justice Scalia, profess fidelity to the text and history of the Constitution, your story of the original understanding of our constitutional system of government must include a healthy appreciation for the fact that the Framers sought to create a government strong enough to meet the challenges of governing a nation.
At Crime and Consequences, Kent Scheidegger has a powerful response: A More Perfect Union and a Perfect Straw Man. From the core of the argument:
From the indisputable premise that the Constitution created a federal government strong enough to deal with issues that the Articles of Confederation Congress could not, Wydra seems to be extrapolating to the idea that federal power is infinitely elastic to encompass any problem that is deemed to require a federal solution. … The Convention considered and rejected a broadly worded proposal to empower the federal government to legislate "in all cases in which the separate States are incompetent." Instead, the proper subjects of federal legislation are enumerated in Article I, section 8. If this list proves inadequate, the way to expand them is provided in Article V, amendments. For example, each of the post-Civil War amendments (13-15) includes a new power in Congress to enforce its substantive provisions.
Nothing in the Articles of Confederation background that Wydra lays out contradicts the view of originalists that the Constitution must be enforced as originally understood unless and until amended via Article V. That includes the proposition that the powers of Congress are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution and its amendments.
(Via SCOTUSblog).
I think Scheidegger carries the argument here, and indeed could put it even more strongly than he does. Of course it's true that the problems under the Articles led to a desire for a stronger national government (stronger, that is, than the Articles, under which the national government was extremely weak). But the nationalizing impulses of Convention delegates such as Hamilton, Wilson and Morris encountered serious opposition from the Convention's majority, and even the nationalist delegates recognized that they had to moderate their positions and endorse meaningful limits on national power to have a hope of selling the Constitution to the country as a whole. (Morris, speaking against Madison's proposal for a national "negative" on state laws, said it would be "terrible to the states"). The document was, fundamentally, a compromise between the need for a more effective national government (compared to a very weak baseline) and a visceral fear of concentrated national power.
Posted at 6:01 AM