John T. Valauri (Northern Kentucky University – Salmon P. Chase College of Law) has posted Comstock, Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Constitutional law is plagued by meaning conflict at both the doctrinal and the theoretical levels. This article takes up two loci of such conflict and contest of constitutional meaning — the Necessary and Proper Clause (recently visited by the Supreme Court in the Comstock case) and the reasonable person device in the New Originalism — so that insight might be gained from the mutual comparison and illumination of their problems. In this process, dialogue replaces just “looking for one’s friends” in constitutional argument as various voices are considered and not silenced so that a favored one may be privileged. The result of this reciprocal examination is a paired argument for a fiduciary, agency law model of the Necessary and Proper Clause and also for a Dialogic Originalism as a replacement for the currently fashionable reasonable person New Originalism.
Via Larry Solum at Legal Theory Blog, who comments:
For the record, the idea of "public meaning" does not depend on a hypothetical reasonable person, and can be cashed out by appeal to regularities in the linguistic practices of actual persons. For my version, see Semantic Originalism.
Posted at 7:00 AM