Hrafn Asgeirsson (Monash University, Faculty of Law) has posted Textualism, Pragmatic Enrichment, and Objective Communicative Content (Monash University Faculty of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2012/21) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Textualist legal reasoning usually involves
something like the following thesis: the legal content of a statute is the
linguistic content that a reasonable member of the relevant audience would,
knowing the context and conversational background, associate with the
enactment. I offer a fairly straightforward argument for this thesis and
proceed to apply the underlying pragmatic framework to two longstanding issues
in the debate about textualism. First, I argue that the framework allows us to
show that there is – contra critics – a principled distinction between the
different textualist reasonings in the cases of Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co. and United States v. Marshall. Second, I argue that the framework confers a
non-negligible amount of plausibility on what John Perry has recently called
conception-textualism – a view that he has pronounced 'confused, implausible,
and unworkable.' I also briefly compare my linguistic argument for conception-textualism
with Justice Scalia’s non-linguistic argument for it, the main premise of which
concerns the constitutive function of constitutions.
Posted at 6:09 AM