April 07, 2013

This is the fourth paper presented at the Notre Dame roundtable on the Constitution and unwritten law — Curtis A. Bradley (Duke Law School) and Trevor W. Morrison (Columbia Law School, but soon to be Dean at NYU Law): Presidential Power, Historical Practice and Legal Constraint (Columbia Law Review, forthcoming).  Here is the abstract from SSRN:

The scope of the President’s legal authority is determined in part by historical practice. This Essay aims to better understand how such practice-based law might operate as a constraint on the presidency. In part because of the limited availability of judicial review in this area, some commentators have suggested that presidential authority has become “unbounded” by law and is now governed only or primarily by politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in any systematic or reliable fashion. Whether and how practice-based law might constrain the President are thus vital questions. As the Essay explains, no examination of those questions can succeed without careful specification of what legal constraint entails and how it relates to distinct but related phenomena like genuine disagreement about the content of the law. After attempting such specification, the Essay identifies various internal and external causal mechanisms through which law, including practice-based law, could constrain the President. The Essay argues, among other things, that one way that law might operate as a constraint is through the simple fact that issues of presidential power are publicly criticized and defended in legal terms. The Essay concludes by suggesting some avenues of possible empirical research.

The article's reference to "some commentators" who "have suggested that presidential authority has become “unbounded” by law and is now governed only or primarily by politics" has as its principal target Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic.  For my take (with Saikrishna Prakash) on the Posner/Vermeule thesis, see here.  I think Bradley and Morrison are right that there are important legal constraints on the executive –many of them originalist-based, I would add – even in the absence of judicial review.  I would go further than Bradley and Morrison, though: despite the many changes of the last 200+ years, the basic structure of the modern President's office remains constrained by the basic structure of the Constitution: the President (as a general matter) cannot on his own authority make national law by decree, imprison people or seize their property without judicial process, or interfere with the political and legal operations of the states.  The situations in which the President claims these powers are the (often contested) exceptions, not the rule.  And these are not "natural" or inherent limits on the office of Chief Magistrate; they arise from the constitutional (i.e., legal) description of the office.  As Professor Prakash and I conclude, the argument for an "unbound" executive is essentially normative rather than descriptive: it is what the authors would like to see, not what actually can be seen.  Unsurprisingly, people who would like to dispense with legal limits on the executive – such as Posner and Vermeule — are fundamentally anti-originalist.  And commentators critical of originalism in other areas would do well to consider what abandoning originalism would mean for constraints on executive power.

Posted at 6:40 AM