Via How Appealing, an interesting decision by the Tenth Circuit last week in United States v. Hatch (opinion by Judge Tymkovich here). From the introduction:
Three New Mexico men kidnaped a disabled Navajo man and branded aswastika into his arm. The United States charged the assailants with committing a hate crime under the recently enacted Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009), codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 249. As relevant here, the Hate Crimes Act makes it a felony to physically attack a person because of that person’s race.
The three assailants contended in district court that the Hate Crimes Act is unconstitutional, claiming Congress lacks the authority to criminalize purely intrastate conduct of this character. The government countered that the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery in the United States, gave Congress the necessary authority. The district court agreed with the government, holding that Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment authorized it to enact 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), the portion of the Hate Crimes Act under which the three men were charged.
The court affirms on the basis of precedent, but reading between the lines one senses an element of doubt. After all, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits "slavery [and] involuntary servitude" and gives Congress power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"; Supreme Court precedent later gave Congress power to prohibit the "badges and incidents" of slavery; and still later Supreme Court precedent decided that the "badges and incidents" of slavery include all forms of private racial discrimination, apparently regardless of what race is affected, if that was Congress' view of its own power. As the court concludes:
In particular, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)—a case permitting a federal private right of action against private individuals for housing discrimination—that Congress itself has power to determine those badges and incidents.
Section 249(a)(1) rests on the notion that a violent attack on an individual because of his or her race is a badge or incident of slavery. Congress reached this conclusion by accounting for the meaning of “race” when the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, the state of mind of the attacker, and the attack itself. By so doing, and under the authority of Jones, we conclude Congress rationally determined that racially motivated violence is a badge or incident of slavery against which it may legislate through its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
As the court elaborates:
At its core, Hatch’s argument raises important concerns we share. “Badges and incidents of slavery,” taken at face value, puts emphasis solely on the conduct Congress seeks to prohibit, and it seems to place few limits on what that conduct might be. Given slaves’ intensely deplorable treatment and slavery’s lasting effects, nearly every hurtful thing one human could do to another and nearly every disadvantaged state of being might be analogized to slavery—and thereby labeled a badge or incident of slavery under Jones’s rational determination test. In effect, this interpretation gives Congress the power to define the meaning of the Constitution—a rare power indeed. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. And many legal scholars have encouraged broad use of Section 2 power in essentially this way, which would arguably raise the sort of federalism concerns articulated in City of Boerne, Lopez, and Morrison. Others have argued for a narrower interpretation that relates more directly to slavery as an institution rather than to any individual feature of slavery.
While this debate raises worthwhile questions, the Supreme Court has never revisited the rational determination test it established in Jones. And more importantly for our purposes, none of the federalism authorities Hatch cites mention Jones or the Thirteenth Amendment. Thus, even if we assume Hatch’s authorities impliedly undermine Jones’s approach to the Thirteenth Amendment, we may not blaze a new constitutional trail simply on that basis: “If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case”—such as Jones has to this case—“yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 559 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“[T]he Supreme Court has considerable discretion in resolving [novel constitutional questions]. [That] does not free lower court judges from the duty to respect the language and direction of the Court’s precedents . . . .”).
The court also cites extensively the outstanding work of Jennifer Mason McAward (Notre Dame Law School), a skeptic of a broad view of the Thirteenth Amendment who has written extensively on the Amendment's history and its relationship to federalism (see here, here, and here). Professor McAward gave the latter paper (later published in the Columbia Law Review) at the San Diego originalism works-in-progress conference last year.
It's not my field, but skepticism certainly seems warranted. As I understand current law after the Hatch decision, the federal government could prosecute a Black defendant for an attack on a White victim, in the name of enforcing the Constitution's prohibition on slavery. That seems to suggest that something has gone wrong somewhere.
Posted at 6:17 AM