Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl (University of Houston Law Center) has posted Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court (Cornell Law Review, forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Is statutory interpretation an activity that all courts should perform the same way? Courts and commentators implicitly so conclude. I believe that conclusion is wrong. Statutory interpretation is a court-specific activity that should differ according to the institutional circumstances in which the interpreting court is embedded. The U.S. Supreme Court is not the model all other courts should emulate.
I identify three kinds of institutional differences between courts that bear on which interpretive methods are appropriate: (1) the court’s place in the hierarchical structure of appellate review, (2) the court’s technical capacity and resources, and (3) the court’s democratic pedigree, particularly as reflected in methods of judicial selection. Attending to these institutional factors would yield insights for both judicial practice and academic theory. In terms of prescriptions for courts, the differences justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods. But even apart from the specific recommendations, the larger point is that scholars need a normative account of what lower-court statutory interpretation should look like. Such a normative framework would help us evaluate the lower courts’ output (which is becoming the subject of an important and growing body of descriptive work) and determine which of the Supreme Court’s practices should – and should not – be followed in the lower courts.
Recent high-profile statutory interpretation scholarship like this (see also yesterday's post on the outstanding comparative piece by Holger Fleischer) raises an important series of questions for originalist theory. When we speak of originalism, do we mean specifically originalism in constitutional interpretation? Or do we mean more broadly interpretation of legal texts according to their original meaning? Does the analysis in statutory scholarship carry over to constitutional interpretation? Is there justification for treating one type of legal text differently from another? I'm not at all sure of the answers. But it does seem useful, in discussing constitutional interpretation, to consider whether one's views of the right approach carry over to statutory interpretation (and vice versa), and if not, why not.
Posted at 7:00 AM