September 19, 2012

Mike Dorf had this post at Dorf on Law a little while ago on the Posner/Scalia faceoff: Posner Versus Scalia: Posner Wins the War But Loses One Battle.  While generally his account of Judge Posner’s review seems a bit credulous, Professor Dorf had this important criticism:

Still, on one point, I think Posner's critique falls short.  Scalia and Garner say that textualism is inherently neither conservative nor liberal because text can be either conservative or liberal depending on whether the legislature that wrote it was conservative or liberal.  Posner says the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise.  Textualism, Posner says, refuses to apply legislation where the text does not expressly apply.  Thus, "textualism hobbles legislation–and thereby tilts toward 'small government' and away from 'big government,' which in modern America is a conservative preference."

I think Posner is probably wrong about that claim, as can be illustrated by an old example–which he and the book discuss.  The question is whether a law forbidding "vehicles in the park" forbids ambulances.  The issue here is whether a court should find a tacit exception to law phrased in categorical terms.  Other things being equal, the textualist approach will say no, while the purposivist approach will say yes: if the legislature had thought of this example it would not have wanted the prohibition to apply to ambulances.  So in this example, textualism leads to greater regulation (constraining more types of vehicles), while purposivism leads to less regulation.  And that pattern will hold whenever a court must decide whether to find tacit exceptions to a prohibition or regulation.

I’ll add a few thoughts.  First, I’m not persuaded that conservatives favor “small government” in the sense of less regulation.  It seems more accurate to say conservatives like some regulations (of abortion, pornography, drugs, immigration, some types of speech) and liberals like other regulations (of economic activity, land use, guns, oversize sodas, different types of speech).  The current liberal/conservative big government/small government debate is more about taxes and spending, which isn’t really relevant to textualism.  It’s true, of course, that libertarians favor less regulation across the board, so I suppose you could say (if you accept Posner’s argument) that textualism is libertarian.  But that wouldn’t serve the review’s purpose of making Justice Scalia’s attachment to textualism look politically motivated, because no one thinks of Scalia as a libertarian.  (As an aside, I think he has more libertarian tendencies than people recognize, but I don’t think there’s any connection between his occasional libertarian-ish tendencies and his textualism).  

Second, I think Professor Dorf is right that the association of textualism with less regulation is misconceived, though I think the point can be made even more emphatically.  For any legal text, a non-textualist can argue that it should cover less activity than the text appears to cover or that it should cover more activity than the text appears to cover.  Moreover, some legal texts restrict private behavior and some restrict governmental behavior.  So going further than the text appears to go leads to more regulation in the former situation and less regulation in the latter.  With this many factors in play, it seems speculative at best to say that textualism has a systematic bias against regulation.

Rather, it seems that textualism leads to comparatively less regulation if the text’s enactors are more libertarian than the current judges (and vice-versa).  I’m not sure, however, that there is likely to be a consistent pattern on this axis in either direction.  Rather, it seems more likely that the tensions between the enactors and the judges will be on the liberal/conservative axis.  Thus textualism (assuming it is faithfully followed) will favor liberal results when the judges are more conservative than the enactors, and favor more conservative results when the judges are more liberal than the enactors.  (I mean in terms of conventional modern political outcomes).

Third, this doesn’t suggest any particular bias across the universe of legal texts, but it does suggest that textualism might consistently lead to more conservative (or liberal) results with respect to a particular text in a particular era.  For example, one might conclude that modern judges are generally more liberal than the enactors of the Constitution.  To be clear, this speculation concerns only a tendency across the whole range of cases – there are plenty of examples where a textual reading of the Constitution produces a liberal result in modern political terms.  But might it be true that on average it produces more conservative results?

If so, that might explain why textualism has more appeal to conservatives than liberals (and why libertarians aren’t sure what to make of it).  It might also explain why in modern law textualism has broader appeal in statutory interpretation than it does in constitutional interpretation: the political stakes are less significant.

Mike Rappaport adds: For my own post criticizing Judge Posner's claim that textualism supports smaller government and purposivism favors larger government, see here.

Posted at 7:00 AM

July 23, 2012

At The Washington Post, Randy Barnett on We Lost on health care. But the Constitution won

Posted at 5:36 PM