Jeremy M. Christiansen (University of Utah – S.J. Quinney College of Law) has posted three articles on SSRN that discuss Originalist interpretations of Utah's constitution. The articles are posted here:
1) Some Thoughts on Utah Originalism: A Response; here is the abstract:
Scholars have spilt a lot of ink debating the merits of the interpretative philosophy known as “originalism.” Although debates over the propriety of originalism generally revolve around its application to the U.S. Constitution, it is no surprise to see that the debate has begun to occupy the sphere of state constitutional law in the decades following Justice William Brennan’s famous calls for state courts to enforce individual rights via state constitutions. Utah is no stranger to this debate. Recent commentary has raised two thoughtful and important questions regarding originalism as applied to the Utah Constitution. First, is originalism the dispositive method of Utah constitutional interpretation? And second, would proper application of originalism in Utah allow for public policy considerations in determining the meaning of constitutional provisions?
This Article is a modest attempt to challenge answers already given to the first question, and to add to the scholarship regarding the second. Part I will set out the arguments that have been put forward to answer the first question — that strong originalist pronouncements by the Utah Supreme Court may be disregarded or are at least not dispositive in constitutional questions. The Article will then respond by demonstrating that the linchpin of that view—language contained in a case called State v. Tiedemann — is at best aberrational when compared to caselaw that came before and after Tiedemann, as well as subsequent cases relying on Tiedemann.
Part II will then briefly address arguments that commentators have used to suggest that policy considerations are potentially a legitimate factor in Utah originalism. The three main points forward to support this idea are: (1) that Utah Supreme Court Justices were popularly elected at the founding; (2) that judicial review was widely used at the founding; and (3) that the Constitution is easier to amend than its federal counterpart. Part II will conclude that founding-era caselaw suggests the opposite — that Utah’s framers saw themselves as bound by the general understanding of the written text at the time the text was ratified. Part III will briefly conclude as well as suggest the importance of originalism in Utah constitutional jurisprudence.
2) A Remedy for the Rest of Us: How an Originalist Interpretation of State Prohibitions on Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Can More Fully Protect Individual Rights; here is the abstract:
All fifty states have constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. And nearly all of them are textually identical to the Fourth Amendment. For example, the Utah Constitution, article I, section 14 purports to protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Yet despite the lofty aspirations alluded to in the text of article I, section 14, it would be less than accurate to say that all people in Utah enjoy the right to be free from an unreasonable search or seizure. That this is the case follows from a basic premise of American law — for there to be a right, there must be a remedy. And the Utah Supreme Court has evinced a desire to follow the federal rule of excluding evidence as a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures. But what about the citizens who are unreasonable searched yet don’t have illegal contraband on them? This Article will attempt to use Utah as an example of state constitutional law that is ripe for returning to the originally contemplated remedy for search and seizure violations — a private, constitutional tort against the offending officer. Utah’s swift adoption of a search and seizure provision, along with later caselaw, suggests that Utah adopted an already-established, constitutional tort regime. Notably, this originalist interpretation is by no means limited to Utah’s borders. Many surrounding states appear to have contemplated the same system. Utah and other states should adhere to the original meaning of their search and seizure provisions so that all of their citizens — not just those who happen to possess illegal contraband — receive this important constitutional protection.
3) Takings' and 'Damagings': A Return to the Original Meaning of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution; here is the abstract:
Utah, like nearly every other state in the Union, has a constitutional provision similar to the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. And like those of many other states, Utah’s Constitution guarantees just compensation not only in situations where the government takes private property for public use, but also in instances where the government damages private property for public use. A problem has arisen, however, regarding how the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted these two important provisions.
In interpreting the Utah Constitution in scenarios other than those involving the Utah Just Compensation Clause — article I, section 22 — the court has consistently taken a strong position that its purpose is to determine the meaning of the text that would have been understood by Utah’s founding generation. But analyzing the court’s current interpretation of article I, section 22 suggests that the court has not adhered to an originalist approach. Rather, the court has created a confusing framework that convolutes the concepts of a “taking” and a “damaging” as originally understood. For instance, the court has taken notion of causation — that should go to the question of whether something has been taken or damaged — and imported it into the concept of “public use.” Moreover, the court has held that in order for a governmental action to qualify as a damaging under article I, section 22, there must be a physical injury to the property — a requirement that clearly precludes the ability to claim that property interests have been damaged. Although there is some basis in early Utah caselaw for these requirements, the court has made no serious attempt at justifying its framework in terms of originalism. Nor has it attempted to reconcile the fact that these requirements are expressly at odds with the understanding of Utah’s framers as expressed in the Convention. This Paper will set out to provide some course correction in order to establish a conceptually clear framework for assessing takings and damagings that is more consistent with the text and original meaning of article I, section 22.
Posted at 6:56 AM