George Will's latest Washington Post column is: Judicial Activism Isn't a Bad Thing.
Ed Whelan comments (unfavorably): George Will's Embrace of Judicial Activism. In setting out a counter-position, he writes:
Most contemporary conservative proponents of judicial restraint are also proponents of originalism and see judicial restraint merely as supplementing originalist methodology when that methodology fails to yield a sufficiently clear answer to a constitutional question. These proponents of originalism and judicial restraint aim, in other words, to have judges enforce the rights, and limits on power, that the Constitution, fairly construed, sets forth, and to prevent judges from inventing rights and powers that are not in the Constitution. I don’t see how any conservative could object to that approach (though I of course recognize that there is plenty of disagreement among originalists on what some provisions of the Constitution mean).
Paul Mirengoff (Powerline) comments: Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint.
I'm not sure the contenders are all that far apart here (although their relative agreement may be obscured by different definitions of "judicial restraint"). Will's main target, it seems to me, is restraint of the Judge Wilkinson variety. To the extent that Whelan and Mirengoff believe that judges should regularly enforce the Constitution's original meaning against modern majorities, they are not fully in the "restraint" camp, as Will defines it. Rather, I suspect the true point of contention is the extent to which the Constitution's original meaning protects economic liberties as a general matter. Will, as reflected in his invocation of Clark Neily's new book, seems increasingly to believe it does, whereas I'd guess Mirengoff and Whelan mostly think otherwise.
Posted at 6:06 AM