February 20, 2014

Courts around the country have been increasingly inclined to strike down state constitutional provisions that limit "marriage" to one man and one woman. This is being done primarily under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. I have written here before about this subject, and am grateful for this opportunity to discuss the issue in a somewhat different way.

As a matter of principle, I still believe that the Equal Protection Clause only protects types of equality that comport with laws that existed (somewhere) in the United States around 1866, when the Equal Protection Clause was proposed by Congress. Thus, for example, schools were desegregated in Massachusetts and Iowa as of 1866, so that form of equality is a plausible subject of nationwide enforcement nowadays under the Equal Protection Clause.  Same goes for interracial marriage; the vast majority of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is consistent with at least some state laws that were in force as of 1866. Under this principle, I do not think that same sex marriage can be legitimately required under the Equal Protection Clause, in the face not just of history, but additionally against the present democratic sentiment within a state.

Justice Robert Jackson once wrote in an unpublished draft opinion that, “Constitutions are easier amended than social customs, and even the North never fully conformed its racial practices to its professions.” Accordingly, it is not difficult for me to accept that the Equal Protection Clause professed things that were then inconsistent with an aspect of the laws in a majority of states, but inconsistency with the laws of every single state is a bridge too far.

Properly understood, the Equal Protection Clause is not a license for judges to enforce whatever principles of equality that they (or even a majority of states) may now favor, be it marriage equality regardless of gender, or income equality regardless of occupation, or sentence equality regardless of crime, or grade equality regardless of schoolwork. Advocates of unlimited judicial discretion often quote an opinion for the Court in which Justice Stanley Matthews wrote: “the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” The Court’s complete sentence was not so sweeping: “These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality, and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” The idea that the Equal Protection Clause is “a pledge of the protection of equal laws” cannot possibly be a complete interpretation of the Clause, because such an interpretation would essentially shorten the Clause to read that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection”. The deleted words would have no effect whatsoever. Unfortunately, courts sometimes mangle the Equal Protection Clause in exactly that way (e.g. Judge Jack Weinstein once wrote that “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may deny equal protection to any person within its jurisdiction”).

The words “of the laws” in the Clause must have some force, and so the interpretation often attributed to Justice Matthews must be incomplete. The words “of the laws” would have appropriate force if we interpret the word “the” not in a generic sense (e.g. “the morning is a nice time of the day”) but rather as a definite article referring to particular laws known to the people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. That would include not just the laws circa 1866 of a single state, but rather all the laws in the country circa 1866; after all, the Equal Protection Clause uses the words “of the laws” rather than “of its laws” (a point very familiar to framers of the Fourteenth Amendment). In short, the Equal Protection Clause must mean that no state may deny to anyone within its jurisdiction equal protection, with equality understood from known laws of 1866. If we were to replace “1866” with whatever the current date is, then we would have an absurd scenario in which the states could now decide to pass whatever racist laws they want, as long as they do so jointly (or an implausible scenario in which Congress would have power under not just Section Five but also under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment).

Suppose that I am all wrong in my firm belief about the Equal Protection Clause. Even under an unconvincing supercharged interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, saving constructions and severability of statutes must have limitations, and courts have no power to redefine a word ("marriage") that is manifestly different from what the word meant to legislators. If courts possessed carte blanche to adopt whatever constructions are necessary to render a statute constitutional, then there would never be any need to strike down any statute whatsoever.

But, again, suppose that I am wrong. Suppose not only that the Equal Protection Clause is completely untethered from the other laws in force in 1866, but also suppose that courts may adopt entirely new meanings of words to save statutes from unconstitutionality. Still, if a state legislature wants to treat civil unions the same as "marriages" in all but name, then that would seem perfectly constitutional. The courts have not required states to call all disabled people "healthy people" nor required states to call all African-Americans "white people" nor required states to call all women "men", nor (by the same token) is there any plausible legal reason why courts should require all states to call gay couples "marriages". If the mere title of being "married" is so important, then single people would be entitled to that designation as well.

Disclaimer: the preceding essay has been about the constitutionality of statutes, not about whether they are wise or foolish.

[Note: for my somewhat contrary view, see here –ed.]

Posted at 11:45 PM