In today's decision in Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment:
We have held that the Constitution categorically forbids Congress to delegate its legislative power to any other body, Whitman, 531 U. S., at 472, but it has become increasingly clear to me that the test we have applied to distinguish legislative from executive power largely abdicates our duty to enforce that prohibition. Implicitly recognizing that the power to fashion legally binding rules is legislative, we have nevertheless classified rulemaking as executive (or judicial) power when the authorizing statute sets out “an intelligible principle” to guide the rulemaker’s discretion. Ibid. Although the Court may never have intended the boundless standard the “intelligible principle” test has become, it is evident that it does not adequately reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power. I would return to the original understanding of the federal legislative power and require that the Federal Government create generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legislative process.
(Plus extensive history on nondelegation from Justice Thomas, and an interesting concurrence by Justice Alito as well; the majority opinion reaches the narrower conclusion that Amtrak is not a private entity and thus delegation to it is not impermissible delegation to a private entity).
(Via Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSblog).
More here from Josh Blackman, including: "We are very fortunate to have such a thoughtful jurist on the Court, whether you agree with him or not." Agreed.
Posted at 10:47 PM